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Environmental degradation caused by climate change or other
factors will cause migration of those displaced or harmed. Droughts,
desertification, flooding, and other natural disasters have caused such
migration in the past and are likely to increase in the future as a result
of climate change.' Indeed, climate change may become the largest
environmental cause of displacement in the future. 2
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1. See Oli Brown, Int'l Org. for Migration, Migration and Climate Change 16
(2008) (predicting that "climate change will cause population movements by
making certain parts of the world much less viable places to live; by causing food
and water supplies to become more unreliable and increasing the frequency and
severity of floods and storms"). As Brown observes: "[m]igration is (and always
has been) an important mechanism to deal with climate stress." Id. at 21.
2. See Suzette Brooks Masters, Environmentally Induced Migration: Beyond a
Culture of Reaction, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 855, 863-64 (2000) (warning that
"climate change represents a likely future cause of tremendous environmental
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In this essay, I address how immigration policies should respond to
international migration induced by environmental degradation,
especially degradation resulting from climate change. In Part I, I
consider the suggestion that we create a new category of refugee
entitled to special rights under national immigration laws. I suggest
that such a category is unlikely to help most of those harmed by
environmental degradation unless it is so broad as to liberalize
economic migration substantially.
In Part II, I consider the
economics of international migration, which indicates that
liberalization of that migration is likely both to increase global wealth
and to improve its distribution. In Part III, I offer a critique of the
claims advanced by advocates of immigration restriction as a policy
to protect the environment. I argue that we should instead turn to
more equitable and more efficient responses to climate change and
other environmental problems. In Part IV, I conclude that liberalized
immigration laws would instead be part of the optimal response to
environmental problems.
I.

ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRANTS

Although some have suggested treating environmental migrants as
refugees, the legal definition of a refugee under the immigration
laws of the United States and under international law includes only
those fleeing persecution in their home countries, not those fleeing
environmental or economic harm at home.4 This definition makes

damage and displacement, capable of dwarfing all the other factors"); id. at 865
(noting that "some experts forecast that climate change may become the largest
source of displacement in the future").
3. See, e.g., Norman Myers & Jennifer Kent, Environmental Exodus: An
Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena 154 (1995) (urging us "to expand our entire
approach to refugees in general in order to encompass environmental refugees" and
to grant "official standing" to "environmental refugees"); see also Brown, supra
note 1, at 13-14, 36-37 (discussing efforts to expand the definition of "refugee" to
include environmental migrants); Masters, supra note 2, at 866-70 (same).
4. Under U.S. law, a "refugee" must be "unable or unwilling to return" to the
refugee's home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000). Similarly,
international law requires a "refugee" to have a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
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some sense once we recognize that the primary function of these
rules is to grant a particularly needy class of international migrants
special rights under national immigration laws. 5 These special rights
derive their justification from the dire consequences of returning
international migrants to a country in which they face persecution.
Most people directly displaced by environmental degradation can
avoid the most dire consequences of that degradation within the
borders of their home country. 6 In contrast, at least when the
refugee's own government is either the perpetrator or sponsor of
persecution, this persecution raises a presumption against an internal
flight alternative. 7 If we seek a definition suitable for immigration
law purposes, then we would attempt to define a class of
environmental migrants who similarly lack an internal flight
social group or political opinion." Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
5. I am using the term "immigration laws" broadly to include not only laws
regarding admission of immigrants for permanent residence but also laws regarding
more limited rights for aliens seeking entry. These rights may include, for
example, nonrefoulement, which protects a refugee against return to a country of
persecution. See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration and Citizenship:
Process and Policy 845 (6th ed. 2008).
6. There may be some whose only reasonable option will be international
migration. In the face of climate change, for example, "migration may be the only
possible adaptive response in the case of some of the Small Island and low-lying
states where rising seas will eventually flood large parts of the country." Brown,
supra note 1, at 38. "The scope for internal population redistribution within such
countries is limited, so there will be pressure for resettlement in another country."
Graeme Hugo, Environmental Concerns and International Migration, 30 Int'l
Migration Rev. 105, 119 (1996). These cases, however, will be the exception
rather than the rule: "[m]ost people displaced by environmental causes will find
new homes within the boundaries of their own countries." Brown, supra note 1, at
23; see Hugo, supra, at 119 (predicting that "it is within countries that the bulk of
population displacement is likely to occur"); see also Masters, supra note 2, at 868
("[T]he vast majority of environmental migrants are internally displaced persons
who are excluded from the definition of refugee primarily because they have not
crossed international borders, rather than because the environmental factors
inducing their migration do not amount to persecution or concerted state action.").
7. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(3)(ii), 1208.13(b)(3)(ii) (2004); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 1052 (4th ed. 2005) (noting
that "if there is an internal flight alternative," then the alien's "fear of persecution"
is "not well-founded," but "if the government is either the perpetrator or the
sponsor of the persecution ... there is a rebuttable presumption" against such an
alternative).
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alternative. The result, however, would probably be a rather narrow
definition that will be of little use for most migrants harmed by
environmental degradation.
At the same time, we may believe that principles of justice imply
that a broader class of international migrants has a special claim to
immigration based on the environmental cause of the harm that they
are seeking to escape. If the wealthy countries of the world, for
example, are responsible for most emissions of greenhouse gases,
then we might believe that those countries have a special obligation
to mitigate the harm that climate change inflicts on the poor in
developing countries, who have emitted the least per capita. 8 This
moral obligation might include a duty to admit migrants fleeing the
adverse effects of anthropogenic climate change on their quality of
life, 9 even if these adverse effects may not rise to the same level of
harm faced by those fleeing persecution. This rationale makes it
important to identify the effects of anthropogenic climate change in
particular, because the precise cause of migration is important to the
international migrant's moral claim.
If we define this broader class of environmental migrants to
include anyone harmed by anthropogenic climate change, however,
then we may find it difficult to identify members of this class. First,
scientific uncertainty may undermine our ability to attribute any
particular environmental harm to anthropogenic climate change. For
example, if a farmer worker can no longer make a living because the
land he farms has deteriorated as a result of drought and
desertification, then how do we determine whether this desertification
would have occurred even in the absence of greenhouse gas
emissions or is instead the result of anthropogenic climate change?
Tracing the cause of any particular harm may be difficult when
anthropogenic climate change only increases the risk of such specific
events.

8. See Brown, supra note 1, at 39 ("Some analysts are beginning to argue that
immigration is both a necessary element of global redistributive justice and an
important response to climate change; that greenhouse gas emitters should take an
allocation of climate migrants in proportion to their historical emissions.").
9. See Masters, supra note 2, at 879 (arguing that "richer nations" should
"welcome migrants from less developed countries," because "all nations are
partners in a global social contract with global responsibilities," including a duty
"to share in the global environmental burdens that affects nations unequally").

2009]

THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Second, even if we assume that the observed desertification has
been caused by anthropogenic climate change rather than other
factors, the question remains whether the farm worker would have
migrated even in the absence of that desertification. After all, the
process of economic development normally leads workers to migrate
from rural farms to urban labor markets as employment opportunities
expand in local cities. Thus, even in the absence of desertification,
any given migrating farm worker may have left home to seek better
economic opportunities elsewhere. 10
Finally, the problem becomes even more difficult once we
recognize that those who migrate across national borders may flee the
indirect effects of climate change. For example, farm workers
displaced from agriculture may migrate to seek work in local cities
within their home country, driving down wages in those urban labor
markets. The drop in wages may induce other workers with better
access to social networks abroad to emigrate in search of higher
wages in wealthy countries of immigration." These international
migrants, like the farm workers, seek to escape economic harm
caused by climate change.
Similar economic harm arises when a poor country must divert
scarce public resources to adapt to climate change, for example, to
build sea walls to adapt to higher sea levels.' 2 If this adaptation
leaves less in the public treasury to invest in other infrastructure or in
public education, then the result may be a less developed economy
and greater incentives for migrants to leave their home countries in
search of better opportunities elsewhere.
These international

10. See Brown, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that "disaggregating what role

climate change might play in added rural-urban migration is speculative"); id. at 12
(observing that "disaggregating the role of climate change from other
environmental, economic and social factors" in "individual migrants' decisions to
leave their homes" behind "requires an ambitious analytical step into the dark");
Steve Lonergan, The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population
Displacement, Envtl. Change & Sec. Project Rep., Spring 1998, at 5, 12 (noting
that "population movement" occurs "in response to a combination of
environmental, economic, social and political ... stimuli").
11. See Brown, supra note l at 23 ("Migration ... typically requires access to
money, family networks and contacts in the destination country.").
12. See id. at 38 (predicting that "individual countries will have to make a series
of cost-benefit decisions on what they want to protect," for example, by "building
sea walls").
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migrants also seek to escape economic harm caused by climate
change.
If most harm from climate change takes economic forms, however,
then environmental migrants will be difficult to distinguish from
economic migrants who flow along the same paths to seek the same
opportunities in the same destination countries. After all, the
environmental migrant has no more reason than the economic
migrant to favor employment opportunities in countries of
immigration over those available in the country of emigration. A
country of immigration will not find it easy to tell precisely which
migrants would not have migrated but for the widespread effects of
anthropogenic climate change.
For all these reasons, the prospects seem dim for a workable yet
usefully broad legal definition of environmental migrants for
immigration law purposes that successfully distinguishes such
migrants from economic migrants. Our alternatives are probably to
adopt either a narrow definition that excludes many who are harmed
by anthropogenic climate change or a broad definition that in practice
allows many economic migrants to benefit as well. 13 In this sense, an
immigration policy designed to help a large number of environmental
migrants would also require us to tolerate greater flows of economic
migrants.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF MIGRATION
Unfortunately, current immigration policies in the United States
and other wealthy countries are hostile to economic migrants from
developing countries, 14 which would supply most environmental

13. See Masters, supra note 2, at 868 (predicting that "consensus on which
categories of migrants are suitable for inclusion within an expanded definition of
refugee would be very difficult to achieve, and only a limited expansion would be
possible given the enormous number of migrants potentially eligible to become
refugees overnight if the definition were ever changed").
14. See Myers & Kent, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that "migrant aliens prove
unwelcome" and that "developed countries ... are taking steps to further restrict
immigration flows from developing countries"); see also Masters, supra note 2, at
873 (noting that "a major impediment" to "possible policy responses to
environmental displacement" arises because "host countries are increasingly
reluctant to accept immigrants").
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migrants. 15 Less developed countries will tend to be less able to
adapt and more vulnerable to environmental degradation than
wealthy countries. Yet restrictive immigration policies prevent the
poor from fleeing the harm inflicted by climate change in developing
countries.
These restrictive policies remain popular despite the economic
gains that the world enjoys when workers migrate from low-wage
countries to high-wage countries.' 6 Higher wages in the destination
country imply that the marginal product of labor is higher there than
in the source country. That is, higher wages for the same worker
mean that the worker produces more value in the destination country
than in the source country. Labor migration generally leads to net
gains in global wealth because labor flows to the country where it has
the highest-value use. 17 For this reason, basic economic theory raises
a presumption in favor of the free movement of labor. Immigration
restrictions distort the global labor market, producing a misallocation
of labor among countries, thereby wasting human resources and
creating unnecessary poverty in labor-abundant countries.
In fact, the World Bank has recently studied the potential gains
from a modest increase in migration from "developing" countries to
"high-income countries" and concluded that such an increase "would
generate large increases in global welfare."' 18 The gains would be
distributed such that if we examine the effects on natives in countries
of immigration, on the migrants, and on those left behind in countries
of emigration, we find that each group would enjoy significant gains.
The migrants would gain by obtaining higher wages in destination
countries, natives in destination countries would obtain goods and
15. See Brown, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that "the developing countries - the
least responsible for emissions of greenhouse gases - will be the most affected by
climate change").
16. The discussion that follows draws from a more extended discussion in
Howard F. Chang, The Economic Impact of International Labor Migration: Recent
Estimates and Policy Implications, 16 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 321, 322-26
(2007).
17. See Paul R. Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics:
Theory and Policy 158-59 (2d ed. 1991).
18. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of

Remittances and Migration 25-26 (2006). The World Bank concludes that an
increase in migration sufficient to increase the labor force in the host countries by
3% by the year 2025 would increase the world's real income by $356 billion in
2025. See id. at 31.
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services from immigrant labor at lower cost, and those left behind in
source countries would enjoy a net gain from 9remittances sent home
by migrants working in destination countries.'
III. ENVIRONMENTAL RESTRICTIONISM

Regrettably, restrictive immigration policies enjoy political support
from some in the environmental movement in the United States.20 In
2004, for example, the leadership of the Sierra Club had a heated
debate over whether to advocate immigration restrictions, with
Richard Lamm, the former Democratic governor of Colorado,
arguing in favor of a restrictionist agenda.2 ' Although the Sierra
Club decided to remain neutral on the issue,22 as have most
environmental groups, 23 some environmentalists have defended
restrictive immigration policies. 24 Garret Hardin, for example,
argues for restrictionist immigration policies because migration of
poor people into rich countries means "speeding up the destruction of
the environment in rich countries."25 In a similar vein, Roy Beck
cites water pollution in lakes and rivers, urban air pollution, and

19. See id. at 34.
20. Restrictionist policies derive similar support in Australia, where Graeme
Hugo reports that "the argument that immigrants exacerbate environmental
pressures is gathering strength in the ongoing national debate about immigration
levels." Hugo, supra note 6, at 122.
21. See Felicity Barringer, Bitter Division for Sierra Club on Immigration, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 16, 2004, at Al. The Sierra Club also debated this issue several years
earlier. See John H. Cushman, An Uncomfortable Debate Fuels a Sierra Club
Election, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1998, § 1, at 14.
22. See Felicity Barringer, Establishment Candidates Defeat Challengers in
Sierra Club Voting, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2004, at A18.
23. See David Hunter et al., International Environmental Law and Policy 100
(3d ed. 2007).
24. See Aleinikoff et al., supra note 5, at 487 (noting that "[s]ome
environmentalists have taken a lead role in efforts to restrict immigration," in order
to reduce "air and water pollution, urban sprawl, climate change, and wasteful
consumption"); Legomsky, supra note 7, at 75 (noting that some environmentalists
"fear that high levels of immigration, by increasing the population size .

. . ,

will

exacerbate congestion, sprawl, pollution, and consumption of scarce resources").
25. Garret Hardin, Living on a Lifeboat, 24 BioScience 561, 566 (1974).
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"urban sprawl" as reasons26 for Congress "to set immigration... as
'
close to zero as possible."
Immigration restrictions, however, are misguided from an
environmental perspective.
Although migrants may impose
environmental costs in the host country, their emigration may
produce greater environmental benefits in the source country, where
population growth may increase pollution or deforestation.

As the

National Research Council has observed, "[flrom a world
perspective, (negative) environmental effects in the United States
may be counterbalanced by possible (positive) effects in the sending
countries that are losing population." 27

In this sense, those who

defend immigration restrictions as a way to avoid urban sprawl or
local pollution at home exhibit an especially myopic brand of

environmentalism, one focused on the domestic effects of
immigration rather than on the total effect of migration on the global
environment as a whole. 28 This perverse myopia is ironic in a
movement known for urging us to "think globally."
A. InternationalMigration and Population Growth
There are restrictionists who argue against immigration in terms of

effects on the global environment or on the environment in countries
of emigration.

Some restrictionists suggest that migration will

undermine incentives for citizens of countries of emigration to
protect their local environment or to curb population growth. John

26. Roy Beck, The Case Against Immigration: The Moral, Economic, Social,
and Environmental Reasons for Reducing U.S. Immigration Back to Traditional
Levels 248-49 (1996); see id. at 228-36 (citing environmental impacts in the United
States as a reason to cut off immigration); see also David Miller, Immigration: The
Case for Limits, in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics 193, 202 (Andrew I.
Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2005) (worrying about immigration's
"impacts on the physical environment," such as "congestion" and reduced "access
to open space").
27. National Research Council, The New Americans: Economic, Demographic,
and Fiscal Effects of Immigration 99 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds.
1997) [hereinafter NRC].
28. For a defense of a cosmopolitan normative framework, which adopts a
global perspective on the morality of immigration restrictions, see Howard F.
Chang, The Economics of International Labor Migration and the Case for Global
Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 41 Cornell Int'l L.J. 1, 11-25
(2008).
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Rawls, for example, worries that people may be tempted to "make up
for their irresponsibility in caring for their land and its natural
resources

. . .

by migrating into other people's territory." 29 Similarly,

Joseph Heath speculates that liberalized migration could undermine
incentives for countries to adopt "population control measures" and
policies "preventing long-term environmental degradation" at
home. 30 "Would any country any longer try to limit its birth rate,"
Herman Daly asks, if its citizens were free to "migrate
abroad... ?'31 In a similar vein, Virginia Abernethy asserts that the
"[o]pportunity to immigrate to the United States as well as large-scale
international aid are probable factors contributing to high fertility in
Third World countries." 32 Insofar as population growth generates
greater pressure on natural resources in the global commons, any
tendency for migration to undermine population control would also
harm the global environment.
We must weigh these conjectures, however, against the empirical
evidence indicating that migration would instead reduce population
growth. Migrants who move from developing countries with high
fertility rates to developed countries with low fertility rates often
reduce their own fertility to the lower rates prevailing in the country
Immigration restrictions force prospective
of immigration. 33
29. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 39 (1999).
30. Joseph Heath, Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Social Contract, 10
Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 343, 348 (1997).
31. Herman E. Daly, Population, Migration, and Globalization, 59 Ecological
Econ. 187, 188 (2006).
32. Virginia Abernethy, The Demographic Transition Revisited: Lessons for
Foreign Aid and U.S. Immigration Policy, 8 Ecological Econ. 235, 247 (1993).
Heath suggests that "if China could count on an ability to export its surplus
population to less crowded parts of the world, the incentive to control it would be
considerably diminished." Heath, supra note 30, at 348; see Miller, supra note 26,
at 201 ("A viable population policy ... requires each state to be responsible for
stabilizing ...

its population over time, and this is going to be impossible . . . if

there are no restrictions on the movement of people between states."). But see Eric
Neumayer, The Environment: One More Reason to Keep Immigrants Out?, 59
Ecological Econ. 204, 206 (2006) ("[T]o my knowledge there is not much evidence
that any country uses the 'safety valve' of migration ...

to avoid tackling domestic

demographic problems.").
33. See Joel E. Cohen, Human Population Grows Up, Sci. Am., Sept. 2005, at
48, 54 (suggesting that migration "may accelerate the slowing of population
growth," because "[m]igrants who move from high-fertility to low-fertility regions
or their descendants often adopt the reduced fertility patterns of their new home,
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migrants to remain in developing countries, where they are likely to
have more children than they would if they instead migrated to
developed countries. 34 Based on this effect, the National Research
Council predicts that "total world population will be slightly
lower,"
35
not higher, with more immigration into the United States.
Furthermore, immigration restrictions may lead developed
countries to adopt fertility policies designed to increase population
growth rates in their native populations. As Russia and the wealthier
countries of Europe see their fertility rates falling and their
populations shrinking and growing older, they find that they have
fewer young workers to support the elderly in their retirement years.
Precisely because these countries resist liberalized immigration from
developing countries as a response to their demographic problem,
some of these countries have adopted the use of financial incentives
instead to encourage their women to have more children. 36 These
fertility policies are perverse in a world of excessive population
growth and scarce natural resources. 37 Liberalized immigration
policies would reduce the demand for such environmentally harmful
fertility policies, because migrants tend to be young workers, those
who have the most years of work still ahead of them and thus the
38
most to gain from access to labor markets in wealthy countries.
with some time delay"); see also Francine D. Blau, The Fertility of Immigrant
Women: Evidence from High-Fertility Source Countries, in Immigration and the
Work Force 93, 127 (George J. Borjas & Richard B. Freeman eds., 1992)
(reporting "indirect evidence suggesting that immigrant women have fewer
children in the United States than they would have had in the source country").
34. See Neumayer, supra note 32, at 206 ("[I]f forced to remain in their
developing sending country, . . . would-be emigrants are likely to have more
children than they will in their chosen country of destination.").
35. NRC, supra note 27, at 99.
36. See C.J. Chivers, Putin Urges Plan to Reverse Slide in the Birth Rate, N.Y.
Times, May 11, 2006, at A6; see also Russel Shorto, No Babies?, N.Y. Times, June
29, 2008 (Magazine), at 34. Russia, for example, has adopted programs to increase
the birth rate by paying subsidies to families that have more children. See Clifford
J. Levy, Its Population Falling, Russia Beckons Its Children Home, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 21, 2009, at Al.
37. See Hunter et al., supra note 23, at 86-101 (discussing the challenges posed
by population growth for the global environment).
38. See NRC, supra note 27, at 353 (estimating the "average fiscal impact of
immigrants" in the United States and concluding that it "is positive in part because
they tend to arrive at young working ages ...and in part because they will help to
pay the public costs of the aging baby-boom generations").

352

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA WREVIEW

[VOL. XX

Finally, insofar as emigration allows incomes to rise in developing
countries, global population growth is likely to fall. Emigration
would reduce the abundance of labor in developing countries and
39
thereby increase real wages in those countries of emigration.
Moreover, remittance payments from migrants will also raise the
standard of living in developing countries.40 The resulting increase
in wealth for developing countries seems likely to reduce birth rates
in those countries toward the low levels prevailing in wealthier
developed countries.4 1
The observation that "higher-income countries are characterized by
lower population growth rates" at the present time is consistent with
the stages of population growth experienced by industrialized
countries over time during their economic development.42 Although
population growth may rise during earlier stages of this process, the
third and final stage, "the period of demographic transition, involves
large declines in the birthrate which exceed the continued declines in
the death rate," suggesting that "reductions in population growth
might accompany rising standards of living." 43 Indeed, since 1975,
"strong evidence indicates that most nations have entered the third
phase, with overall growth rates falling." 44 Given this empirical
evidence, at this point, rising standards of living in developing
countries seem more likely on balance to reduce global population
growth than to increase it. Therefore, the net effect of liberalized

39. See World Bank, supra note 18, at 57-58.
40. See Brown, supra note 1, at 34 (noting that "outmigration can. . . enhance
the economic situation left behind through remittances," which "exceed official
development aid in some developing countries"); id. at 40 (observing that "shutting
borders... undermines remittance economies and denies developing countries the
benefits of access to the international labour market").
41. See Neumayer, supra note 32, at 206 (noting that as "remittance payments
are likely to spur economic development" and "more developed countries have
lower fertility rates," emigration would be "likely" to "have a negative rather than
positive effect on birth rates" in countries of emigration that receive remittances).
42. Tom Tietenberg, Environmental Economics and Policy 103 (4th ed. 2004).
43. Id. at 104-05.
44. Jonathan M. Harris, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics: A
Contemporary Approach 187 (2002); see Eban S. Goodstein, Economics and the
Environment 425 (5th ed. 2008) ("After cresting in the late 1960s, population
growth rates have fallen in many places including China and India, the middle
income countries, and the developed countries: Globally the rate of population
growth fell to 1.3% from 1995 to 2000.").
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immigration laws, which seem likely to promote higher standards of
living in developing countries, would probably be to reduce world
population growth.
B. Poverty as an EnvironmentalPolicy

By increasing wealth for the world's poor, international migration
would also increase the demand for environmental amenities and for
more pollution control in developing countries. As incomes rise, the
political pressure for more environmental protection in those
countries will increase, as the population becomes more able to
afford the costs of pollution abatement.45 Based on this effect and
other consequences of economic development, the "Environmental
Kuznets Curve" or "EKC hypothesis" predicts that "as per capita
incomes rise in real terms, environmental quality will first of all fall
but then, once some 'turning point' has been reached, start to rise."4 6
Indeed, at least for "local and regional pollutants," the available
empirical evidence supports the EKC hypothesis. 47 This evidence
suggests that international migration may promote environmental
protection in many respects by increasing incomes in developing
countries.48

45. See Nick Hanley et al., Introduction to Environmental Economics 130
(2001) ("There is an increasing demand for environmental quality as incomes go
up. This leads to an increase in government protection of the environment, and
increasing green consumerism.").
46. Nick Hanley et al., Environmental Economics in Theory and Practice 426
(2d ed. 2007); see id. ("Reasons given for pollution falling after the turning point,
and environmental quality rising, include . . . a rising demand for environmental
quality resulting in tougher environmental standards.").
47. Hanley et al., supra note 45, at 131 (citing studies of deforestation, sulfur
dioxide, "urban emissions of particulates, and hazardous waste sites"). The most
widely cited study examined "urban air pollution and contamination in river
basins" and found that "air and water quality appear to benefit from economic
growth once some critical level of income has been reached," which "in almost
every case" occurs "at an income of less than $8000 (1985 dollars)" per capita.
Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment,
110 Q.J. Econ. 353, 370 (1995); see, e.g., Harris, supra note 44, at 414 n.1 (citing
Grossman & Krueger, supra, as a study of "sulfur dioxide, smoke, and particulate
matter in air" and "oxygen loss, fecal contamination, and heavy metal
contamination in water" that found evidence of the EKC hypothesis).
48. "In fact," considering all the environmental benefits of poverty reduction in
"poor countries," Eban Goodstein concludes that "the only effective way to
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Furthermore, even if international migration had no effect on
environmental policies, the resulting shift in world population could
still produce environmental benefits. As migrants move from poor
countries to rich countries, their migration tends to move people into
jurisdictions with more stringent environmental regulations.' 9 Any
comprehensive evaluation of the environmental impact of
international migration must consider all of these environmental
benefits.
Finally, insofar as emigration generates higher incomes in
developing countries, this effect would also help alleviate the
economic harm inflicted by climate change on those who stay behind
as well as on those who emigrate. Thus, liberalized immigration
policies allow us to mitigate the consequences of climate change, not
only for environmental migrants who cross international borders but
also for those who remain in their countries of origin. In this sense, a
focus on the international migrants alone understates the degree to
which liberalized immigration laws would compensate the victims of
climate change.
Yet some in the environmental movement fear international
migration precisely because migration will increase wealth for the
poor. In particular, when immigrants enjoy an increase in their own
incomes, some fear that these immigrants will cause greater
environmental harm than if they remained poor in their countries of
origin, because these migrants will adopt the consumption patterns
prevailing in wealthy countries. 50 Residents of wealthy countries,
including the United States, consume fossil fuels and other natural
resources at much higher rates than residents of developing

improve environmental conditions is to alleviate the tremendous poverty faced by
many of the people in these nations." Goodstein, supra note 44, at 423.
49. NRC, supra note 27, at 99 (noting that "efforts to abate environmental
effects at any given level of consumption may ...

be higher in the United States"

than in countries sending immigrants to the United States).
50. See Paul R. Ehrlich & Anne H. Ehrlich, One with Nineveh: Politics,
Consumption, and the Human Future 108 (2004) (worrying that migrants "on
average ... better their condition, become more affluent, consume more, and thus
add more to the overall environmental impact of human beings than if they had
stayed home"); Hunter et al., supra note 23, at 100 ("Given U.S. consumption
patterns, the average immigrant to the United States from a developing country will
cause significantly higher environmental impacts than if they stayed in their native
lands.").
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countries. 51 The United States and other industrialized countries are
major sources of emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases. 52
These environmentalists essentially advocate immigration
restrictions precisely because we expect such restrictions to keep
poor people in the very poverty that they want to escape. This
deliberate use of poverty as an environmental policy is an especially
ugly brand of environmentalism. This embrace of poverty as a policy
instrument ignores the availability of far better, more efficient, more
equitable, and more humane environmental policies.
IV. THE OPTIMAL RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

To the extent that immigrants increase environmental harm, either
in the host country or globally, the optimal response would be
53
environmental policies tailored to specific environmental problems.
For example, if we fear increased emissions of greenhouse gases, we
should impose a tax on such emissions without discriminating against
immigrants. Pollution taxes, such as a carbon tax on fossil fuels, can
internalize negative externalities and deter immigrant and native alike
from the specific activities causing environmental harm. We could
use the revenues from such taxes to reduce income or payroll taxes,
which would benefit native workers. 54 Immigration restrictions are
relatively wasteful and clumsy instruments for environmental

51. See

Aleinikoff

et

al.,

supra note

5,

at 487

(noting

that

some

environmentalists cite the fact that "persons in the United States ... consume
energy and resources at a much higher level than persons in other countries" as a
reason to restrict immigration into the United States).
52. Mary M. Kritz, Time for a National Discussion on Immigration, 36 Int'l
Migration Rev. 33, 34 (2002) (noting that "[d]ue mainly to immigration, U.S.
population growth has climbed" and asking "about the implications of these
population trends in an industrialized society that is highly dependent on fossil
fuels and a major producer of greenhouse gas emissions").
53. See Hugo, supra note 6, at 123 (suggesting that a country of immigration
"will be better off in general using resource management policies targeted to deal
with specific resource and environmental concerns, rather than using immigration
policies").
54. Representative John Larson has introduced a bill in the U.S. Congress to
impose such a carbon tax and to return the revenue to workers through lower
payroll taxes. See John M. Broder, House Bill for a Carbon Tax to Cut Emissions
Faces a Steep Climb, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 2009, at A13.
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protection, because they needlessly sacrifice the benefits of
migration, including the gains from international trade in the labor
market. The collateral damage caused by immigration restrictions
includes the poverty inflicted on those excluded by our restrictive
policies.
Indeed, to some extent, migration would be part of the optimal
response to environmental problems such as climate change. Given
the costs of preventing climate change and the costs of other forms of
adaptation, emigration would be part of the optimal mix of responses
to climate change. 55
We should recognize that international
migration is an important form of adaptation, not a symptom of a
failure to adapt.56 International migration mitigates the harm caused
by climate change to its victims. Immigration restrictions make
climate change more costly than necessary by blocking this obvious
avenue of adaptation. 57 Thus, one of our responses to environmental
migration should be to relax these restrictions not only to reduce
global poverty but also to facilitate adaptation to environmental
degradation in developing countries.

55. See Jason Scott Johnston, A Looming Policy Disaster, Regulation, Fall
2008, at 38, 44 (arguing in favor of immigration policies that allow "people in
developing countries at particular risk from global warming ... [to] immigrate to

the safer and more prosperous developed world").
56. Here I paraphrase Brown, who complains about the prevailing attitude of
the international community:
"[m]igration is typically seen as a failure of
adaptation, not a form of it." Brown, supra note 1, at 38.
57. See Masters, supra note 2, at 856 ("In the face of severe environmental
stress, migration is a natural, adaptive, and inevitable occurrence.").

